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Abstract 
 
Modular Supervisory Controller for Complex Systems 
 
Melissa Mei Yun Lee, M.S.E. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisors:  Eric van Oort, Mitch Pryor 
 
Automation for the oil and gas industry is driven by the need to improve 
efficiency, productivity, consistency, and personnel safety, while reducing cost. Fully 
automated systems alleviate the physical toll on human operators and allow them to focus 
on monitoring unsafe well events and machinery maintenance. Complex systems like 
drilling rigs and snubbing units require supervisory controllers that can safely coordinate 
equipment and processes, overcome interoperability challenges and allow for functional 
scalability without sacrificing safety, security, and consistency of operations. The 
primary objective of this report is to explore the feasibility of developing a modular 
supervisory controller architecture which addresses these concerns by modifying and 
extending existing architectures. Such modifications include the use of non-homogeneous 
models in sub-system modules, including discrete event models for control and physics-
based models for collision avoidance, addition of a system compilation module (Meta 
Module) to identify simple design errors, and implementation of an algorithm for 
synthesis of modules and filters to replace missing sub-systems. This report discusses the 
implementation results of the modular supervisory control architecture (modMFSM) on a 
 vi 
simplified two-machine drilling system for assessment of design practices. Simulations 
for three test cases were executed to assess the ability of the controller to correctly 
perform error-free operations, detect and react to possible collisions, and adapt to missing 
equipment. The report then discusses the possibilities of extending the modMFSM 
architecture to control large complex systems such as drilling rigs, using snubbing 
operations as an example. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1 DRILLING AUTOMATION BACKGROUND 
Automation for industrial applications, such as in the manufacturing and the oil 
and gas industries, is driven by the need to improve efficiency, productivity, consistency, 
and personnel safety, while reducing cost (Kurz, 2013). In the oil and gas industry, there 
is ongoing effort in developing mechanized and semi-automatic rig equipment, and 
control systems, supported by high quality instrumentation (Macpherson et al., 2013). 
This technology not only allows many routine drilling operations to be remotely operated 
from the driller’s cabin rather than manually on the rig floor, thereby improving 
personnel safety, but also provides the driller with optimal drilling parameters 
suggestions, dysfunction monitoring and alarms, and regulation of drilling parameters 
within a safety envelope, increasing consistency of performance and drilling dysfunction 
prevention (Macpherson et al., 2013). The advent of commercially available mechanized 
and semi-automatic drilling rig systems has initiated a surge of effort to obtain fully 
automated rigs, which require supervisory controllers that act in the capacity of the 
driller, coordinating rig equipment for execution of drilling activities. Fully automated 
rigs alleviate the physical toll on the rig crew and allow them to focus on monitoring 
unsafe well events and machinery maintenance, while being taken out of harm’s way. 
Due to financial obstacles including hardware acquisition, retraining, and the 
extended life-cycle for rigs and rig equipment, automation efforts have been limited. 
Commercially available supervisory controllers such as the NOV Operating System 
(NOVOS) that allow for fully automated performance of repetitive drilling activities, 
such as tripping, drilling, and pipe connections are currently in development (National 
Oilwell Varco, 2018b). However, these controllers are limited by their lack in modularity 
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and ability to accommodate for varying combinations of equipment from multiple 
sources. This challenge is a major obstacle for development and implementation of fully 
automated drilling rigs (Macpherson et al., 2013).  
1.2 SUPERVISORY CONTROL MOTIVATION 
The motivation for this research was the need to develop a supervisory controller 
architecture for snubbing operations. Snubbing operations are a subset of drilling, 
completions, and production operations, and are performed when it is necessary to run 
pipe or other tubulars into or out of a pressurized well for activities such as tripping, 
underbalanced drilling, milling, fishing, and well control operations (Grace, 2003). The 
main benefit of snubbing is the ability to work in a high pressure well without pumping 
high weight fluids or mud into the wellbore, reducing the risk of damaging the formation 
(Grace, 2003). Snubbing has three main modes of operation: pipe-light, pipe-heavy, and 
balance point (Prebeau-Menezes, 2013). Pipe-light operations are needed when the force 
of the pressurized well exceeds the weight of the drill string, which includes the drill 
pipes, drill collars, various tools, and the drill bit. In pipe-light situations, if downward 
force is not constantly applied to the pipe, forces from the well could expel the drill string 
from the well (Prebeau-Menezes, 2013). Pipe-heavy operations are performed when the 
weight of the drill string exceeds the force of the pressurized well. Balance point 
operations are performed to safely transition the well between pipe-light and pipe-heavy 
operations when the well force approximately equals the weight of the drill string 
(Prebeau-Menezes, 2013). 
Snubbing units can either work as a standalone unit, or as a rig-assist unit, which 
is an add-on to a drilling rig. Equipment on standalone and rig-assist units are similar 
(Prebeau-Menezes, 2013). Appendix A – Snubbing Unit Equipment describes general 
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equipment found on snubbing units. In a traditional snubbing unit, the snubbing crew 
works in a work basket located directly above the wellbore. Working in the work basket 
while the well is under high pressure is extremely dangerous, especially during pipe-light 
operations, during which an expelled pipe could critically injure the crew in the work 
basket (Prebeau-Menezes, 2013).  
Superior Energy Services, Inc. has developed mechanized snubbing rigs which 
allow for remote-control of snubbing equipment and catwalk from an adjacent rig cabin, 
removing crew from the rig floor for routine operations (Superior Energy, 2016). 
Appendix D – Process Narrative Flowcharts for Snubbing presents a detailed process 
narrative of a Superior mechanized snubbing rig. This state-of-the-art technology has 
made significant improvements to snubbing operation safety, and consistency. However, 
many of the repetitive operations such as snubbing in/out tubulars, stripping in/out 
tubulars, and pipe handling during pipe-light and pipe-heavy operations can be fully 
automated by introducing a supervisory controller to send commands and set points to the 
mechanized equipment. Using a supervisory controller to implement repetitive operations 
not only further improves performance consistency and safety but also frees the snubbing 
crew to monitor performance and watch for dysfunctions.  
Snubbing operations are closely related to drilling operations. The smaller 
operations scope of snubbing and the existence of commercially available, mechanized 
snubbing units make snubbing operations a perfect candidate as a platform for developing 
and testing a modular supervisory controller for use in the oil and gas industry. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT & RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
In order to automate systems like drilling rigs and snubbing units, there is a need 
for a supervisory controller that enables easy integration and safe coordination of 
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different automation products. There are a variety of approaches to supervisory control, 
reviewed in Section 2.2 Supervisory Control Techniques Overview, but for most 
individual components such as rig equipment, the well-understood Finite State Machine 
(FSM) is sufficient; however, this approach is untenable when considering the 
coordination of all equipment. As will be shown below, other supervisory controllers 
found in the literature have challenges that need to be addressed prior to application to 
drilling automation in the oil and gas domain. Thus, this report will evaluate the 
feasibility for use of a modified version of the modular finite state machine architecture 
(modMFSM) with modules developed for reconfiguration and environment interaction 
abilities through implementation on a simplified conveyor belt drilling system. This 
report will then discuss the extension of the modMFSM architecture to drilling 
automation with the context of application to snubbing operations. This approach holds 
promise to address modularity and scaling issues, as well as allow use of modules 
encompassing various model structures, and enable automatic generation of modules and 
filters for human intervention when missing equipment. 
The hypothesis of this research is stated below: 
It is feasible to develop a modular, supervisory controller that allows for modularity, 
functional scalability, safe interaction with the environment, and controller 
reconfiguration for complex systems with complicated operations, well-defined tasks, and 
interdependent equipment. 
As shown in the literature review, there is a need for development of a modular 
supervisory controller for complex systems, such as drilling rigs. Controllers for these 
systems must allow for functional scalability without sacrificing safety, security, and 
consistency of operations. As a proof of concept for testing of the modular supervisory 
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controller, a study of implementation on a simplified conveyor belt drilling system is 
performed. In summary, the objectives of the project were to: 
1. Develop a supervisory controller architecture, modMFSM, that addresses the 
critical concerns described above. 
2. Implement the developed solution of a simplified, but representative system. 
3. Demonstrate the controller’s ability to detect potential collisions, and 
accommodate equipment replacement. 
4. Present extension of the controller architecture for implementation for snubbing 
operations. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
This section first provides a review of the state-of-the-art supervisory control as 
used in the oil and gas industry, after which an overview of supervisory control 
techniques is presented.  
2.1 SUPERVISORY CONTROL IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 
Implementation of supervisory control in the upstream oil and gas industry began 
with control and monitoring of production activities in oil fields (De, Silin, & Patzek, 
2000; Dunham, 1987; Niven, 1971; Wilson, 1971). These supervisory systems were 
strictly serial and had slow response times, since “events in the oilfield [do not] occur at 
such a rate that requires immediate computer response” (Wilson, 1971). Since the 
implementation of these supervisory systems, the role of a real-time control system user 
in the oil and gas industry has been “moving away from [manual control in which one] … 
actively monitors the state of a system, identifies when there is the need for control input, 
and takes the necessary action to ensure process parameters remain where they are 
expected to be” toward a role in which one’s “main function is to monitor the automation 
and to be ready and able to intervene – to re-take manual control – should problems arise 
with the automated systems” (McLeod, 2015). 
In the late 1980s, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems 
were developed for monitoring and control of distributed processes where a master 
terminal unit (MTU) controls remote terminal units (RTU) that interact directly with the 
lower level process controllers (Gaushell & Darlington, 1987; Ito, 1997). The challenges 
of SCADA systems are that these systems are best suited for environments with “stable 
ambient conditions,” maintaining reliable communication and calibration is often 
difficult, and there is sensitivity to power fluctuations (Ito, 1997). In addition to SCADA 
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systems, development of mechanized rig equipment for teleoperation began to allow 
remote control of certain drilling operations away from the rig floor; this mechanization 
effort has led to significant progress in development of tele-operated and semi-automatic 
operations (Brugman, 1987; Cao & Moralez, 2016; US5988299 A, 1999; C. W. Lee & 
Won, 2013; Loeyning, 2017; Schlumberger Limited, 2018; Ugasciny, Chang, & 
Hampson, 2016). 
Maturation of increasingly sophisticated mechanized and semi-automatic rig 
systems spurred interest in development of fully automated drilling rigs. Some of the 
major cutting-edge efforts in the industry are detailed in (Ayling, Jenner, & Neffgen, 
2003; Calderoni & Cercato, 2015; Huisman, n.d.; Jacobs, 2015; MacGregor, n.d.; Nabors, 
2018; Nabors Industries Ltd., 2018; Ornas, 2010; West Group, 2015). The surge of effort 
in drilling automation has also led to the development of supervisory control systems for 
automatic execution of drilling sub-operations through employment of automata-like 
network of states shown in (National Oilwell Varco, 2018b), and Petri nets (Prati, 
Farines, & de Queiroz, 2015). Saadallah developed a DES model of a drilling control 
system for coordination of drilling equipment and activities as a Petri net (Nejm 
Saadallah, 2013). Simulations were done to show the feasibility of this control model to 
be implemented for either semi-automatic or fully automatic control of drilling activities. 
NOVOS, a commercially available drilling system with controllers for automatic 
execution of drilling activities is in the process of being expanded to allow for fully 
automatic coordination and execution of drilling activities (National Oilwell Varco, 
2018a).  
In order to fully automate large systems in complex environments such as those 
found in the oil and gas industry, development of supervisory controllers which can 
safely coordinate various equipment and processes are critical. Supervisory control 
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efforts in the oil and gas industry have significantly progressed from automated 
monitoring and control of relatively stable processes in oil fields to development of 
automated drilling processes, which require significantly quicker responses in more 
unpredictable environments. Despite the advancements of supervisory control 
development for drilling in the oil and gas industry, many issues remain to be tackled, 
including those of modularity, and functional scalability, which motivate the need to 
explore the development of a modular supervisory controller architecture for drilling 
operations and other systems of similar size and complexity. 
2.2 SUPERVISORY CONTROL TECHNIQUES OVERVIEW 
Supervisory control is used in applications for which “control and coordination” 
are required for “orderly flow of events” (Ramadge & Wonham, 1989). Supervisory 
controllers should satisfy safety requirements, enable task planning, allow for functional 
scalability, and be verifiable (N. Saadallah, Meling, & Daireaux, 2011). Discrete event 
systems (DES) have discrete state spaces that adapt to “abrupt occurrence, at possibly 
unknown irregular intervals, of physical events” (Ramadge & Wonham, 1989). DES can 
be modeled as untimed, timed, and hybrid systems. Untimed system models are purely 
event-driven and do not rely on time information. Timed system models are ones where 
timing information is crucial. Hybrid systems “combine time-driven with event-driven 
dynamics” (Cassandras & Lafortune, 2011). Recent research on hybrid systems have 
applied them for real-time manufacturing operation as in (Saez, Maturana, Barton, & 
Tilbury, 2018) and analyzed approaches for inclusion of fault detection and isolation as in 
(Khorasgani & Biswas, 2018). The routine operations of the systems considered in this 
report are assumed to be event driven with negligible dependence on timing information. 
Therefore, only DES control techniques will be explored. Although many different types 
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of DES models exist, the more common DES models explored in this literature review 
are finite state machines (FSMs), Petri nets, and Markov decision processes. 
2.2.1 Finite State Machines 
A common approach to modeling DES is through the use of finite state machines 
(FSMs). Deterministic FSMs are represented by the six-tuple 𝐺 = (𝑋, 𝐸, 𝑓, Γ, x0, 𝑋𝑚), 
where 
 
𝑋 = finite set of states 
𝐸 = finite set of events 
𝑓 = transition function that maps starting states and events to ending states 
Γ = active event function to define the events that allow transitions 
𝑥0 = initial state 
𝑋𝑚 = finite set of marked states 
 
There are two basic variants of FSMs: Moore machines which produce outputs as 
a result of the current state, and Mealy machines which produce outputs as a result of the 
transition between states (Cassandras & Lafortune, 2011). In order to capture instances 
when transition allowance depends on external variables such as time, guards—generally 
in the form of if-statements—are added to the transition definitions. Guarded FSMs are 
called extended finite state machines (Fowze & Yavuz, 2016). In traditional automata 
theory, supervisory controllers control FSM systems by disabling undesired transitions 
(Cassandras & Lafortune, 2011)]. In order to ensure desired system behavior, the widely 
used software tools, such as SMV and SPIN, among others, can be used for model 
checking of FSMs. 
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FSMs generally display good performance for small and medium scale systems. 
FSMs “can immediately access the control pattern for each controllable transition based 
on the current encoded state,” and can perform reachability searches, assuring prompt 
controller response, which is crucial for systems with strict real-time requirements (Zhu 
& Brooks, 2009). However, this quick response has a high computational cost dependent 
on the size of the state space. There is potential to mitigate this cost through separation 
into sub-systems that limit the search to the state space of the relevant sub-system. 
2.2.2 Petri Nets 
Using a Petri net is another common approach to modeling DES, and was the 
chosen approach in Saadallah’s drilling control system model (Nejm Saadallah, 2013). 
Petri nets have also been used for hybrid systems, and modular supervisory control 
(Basile, Chiacchio, & Coppola, 2012; J. S. Lee, Zhou, & Hsu, 2007; Lennartson, 
Bengtsson, Wigström, & Riazi, 2016; Nishi, Watanabe, & Sakai, 2018; Wu, Zhou, & 
Chu, 2008). A Petri net is represented by the tuple 𝑆 = (𝑃, 𝑇, 𝐼, 𝑂, 𝑈), where 
 
𝑃 = finite set of places, which can hold tokens for state-specific requirements 
𝑇 = finite set of transitions 
𝐼 = finite set of arcs from places to transitions 
𝑂 = finite set of arcs from transitions to places 
𝑈 = integer vector representing the current marking 
 
The state of the Petri net is shown by its marking, which is a “vector expressing 
the number of tokens in each place” (Zhu & Brooks, 2009). Conditions on transitions in 
Petri nets can be modeled with predicate / transition Petri nets for meeting conditions 
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before transitioning (Genrich, 1986). SMV and SPIN cannot be used for model checking 
Petri nets directly. Methods exist for translation of Petri nets to language used in the 
mainstream formal model checking software like SMV; however, use of finite state 
machines would avoid potential errors that could be lost in translation (Szpyrka, 
Biernacka, & Biernacki, 2014).  
Compared to FSMs, Petri nets have greater modeling power, allow for efficient 
real-time control and analysis due to mathematical computation of properties which 
employ linear matrix algebra, and allow for automatic handling of concurrent events (Zhu 
& Brooks, 2009). “An automaton can always be represented as a Petri net, [but] not all 
Petri nets can be represented as finite-state automata; [therefore], Petri nets can represent 
a larger class of languages” (Cassandras & Lafortune, 2011). Petri nets also provide more 
compact state spaces than FSM, making them better suited to model systems with 
repeated structure (Zhu & Brooks, 2009). Additionally, Petri nets are capable of 
modeling concurrent models in a simpler format than FSMs; however, more problems are 
decidable for FSMs than for Petri nets (Cassandras & Lafortune, 2011). The main trade-
off between FSMs and Petri nets is model richness versus decidability. 
2.2.3 Markov Models 
Markov models are stochastic models that capture environments with 
probabilistic transitions. In order to be modeled by Markov models, the environments 
must be proven to obey the Markov property, which states that the value of the next state 
depends solely on the current state and not the path history that led to the current state. 
Although Markov models are useful for capturing uncertainty, they are data 
intensive and require knowledge of transition probabilities, rewards for each state, action, 
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and observation. They also require “every attribute value combination to be enumerated,” 
which can lead to large state spaces for small problems (Cassandra, 1998). 
2.2.4 Selection of DES Models 
FSMs, Petri nets, and Markov models all have their advantages and 
disadvantages. The choice of which approach to use for control of a DES is specific to 
the application.  Markov models depend heavily on knowledge of the environment that 
may not be available for all systems, which would then require learning techniques. 
Therefore, Markov models were not used for modeling the type of systems explored in 
this paper. In choosing between FSMs and Petri nets, the main point of consideration is in 
model richness versus decidability. Since Petri nets can be derived from FSMs should 
FSMs prove to be unable to provide the level of model richness necessary for controllers 
of the complex systems explored in this paper, FSMs were used in this controller 
architecture to allow for better decidability. 
2.2.5 Modular Approaches Using Finite State Machines 
One of the main disadvantages of modeling systems as FSMs is the tendency for 
the state space to grow rapidly for complex systems, which lead to exponential number of 
states and processes. However, this state space explosion can be mitigated through 
modular controller synthesis by “decomposing the [the system] into simpler 
components…[which allows] greater structure and flexibility to be incorporated into the 
controller” (Ramadge & Wonham, 1989; Thistle, 1996).  
Endsley proposed a particularly promising modular supervisory control 
architecture, which, devised for complex manufacturing systems, decomposes the 
systems into sub-systems housed in structures called modules which interact with each 
 13 
other to form a modular supervisory controller (Endsley, 2004). Since input / output finite 
automata called trigger / response finite state machines (TR FSMs) are used to model the 
subsystems inside the modules, this architecture is called Modular Finite State Machines 
(MFSMs). Unlike traditional finite state machine supervisory controllers which block 
illegal actions of the plant, the MFSM supervisory controller “forces events to occur” (E. 
E. Almeida, Luntz, & Tilbury, 2007). Defined in this section are the major components of 
the MFSM architecture. 
TR FSMs used in MFSM theory are defined by 
FSM = (XFSM,  TFSM,  RFSM,  τFSM, x0FSM ,  xdpFSM ,  XMFSM), where 
 
XFSM = finite set of states in the FSM 
TFSM = finite set of triggers recognized by the FSM 
RFSM = finite set of responses produced by the FSM 
τFSM = finite set of transitions between states in the FSM 
x0FSM  = initial state 
xdpFSM  = dump state (state without outgoing transitions) 
XMFSM = set of marked states (accepting states) 
 
Dump states are generally not shown in the TR FSM diagram unless there exists a 
transition to that state.  
Unlike in traditional automata theory, the supervisory controller in MFSM theory 
is designed to only include desired state transitions rather than disabling actions of the 
DES. Therefore, transitions of TR FSMs are defined by τ = (t𝜏,  xsτ ,  xdτ ,  rτ), where 
 
tτ = trigger for transition 
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xsτ = source state of the transition 
xdτ  = destination state of the transition 
rτ = [rτ,1, … , rτ,mτ] = set of responses as a result of the transition 
 
As previously mentioned, TR FSMs in MFSM theory are housed in modules. The 
modules communicate with each other through ports on the modules called sockets, 
which are defined by, SMi = (TMi ,  RMi), where 
 
TMi = set of triggers that travel in through socket SMi 
RMi = set of responses that travel out through socket SMi 
 
Therefore, modules can be defined by the TR FSM they house and the sockets 
through which they communicate with other modules. A module is defined by M =
(FSM, SM), where  
 
FSM = (XFSM,  TFSM,  RFSM,  τFSM, x0FSM ,  xdpFSM ,  XMFSM)  
SM = {SM1 , … ,  SMn} for n number of sockets  
 
Filters act as the interface between two modules, defining the interaction between 
them. Therefore, filters house classical FSMs with no responses. Filters are especially 
important in the execution of modular verification because modules that satisfy the 
specifications of their filters also satisfy the specifications on their interaction with other 
modules. This type of verification for modular systems is similar to contract-based 
design, which is commonly used for development of component-based software design 
and multi-component cyber-physical systems (Nuzzo, Finn, Iannopollo, & Sangiovanni-
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Vincentelli, 2014; Söderberg & Johansson, 2013). Filters are defined by F =
(FSM,  SFa ,  SFb), where  
 
FSM = (XFSM,  TFSM,  RFSM,  τFSM, x0FSM ,  xdpFSM ,  XMFSM) with RFSM = ∅ 
SFa = (TFa ,  RFa) = a socket 
SFb = (TFb ,  RFb) = b socket   
 
Filters sit on pipes that connect the sockets of communicating modules. Pipes are 
defined by P = (SPa ,  SPb ,  FP), where  
 
SPa = (TPa ,  RPa) = a socket 
SPb = (TPb ,  RPb) = b socket 
FP = (FSM,  SFa ,  SFb) = filter on pipe  
 
Lastly, a system of modules is defined by S = (MS, FS, PS), where  
 
MS = {M1, … , MnM} = finite set of modules in the system 
FS = {F1, … ,  FnF} = finite set of filters in the system 
PS = {P1, … ,  PnP} = finite set of pipes connecting modules and filters  
 
Although the MFSM architecture uses finite state machines in the modules, the 
module-based structure shows potential for individual modules to house different types of 
controllers depending on the specific system represented. 
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2.3 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
In order to test the robustness and correctness of the system controlled by the 
modMFSM, the system must be validated and verified. Validation proves that the system 
has the desired abilities, and verification proves that the system meets the required 
specifications and does not violate safety constraints (Zheng, Julien, Kim, & Khurshid, 
2017). DES can be verified and validated through “test and simulation, model checking, 
and theorem proving” (Allen, Goh, & Tilbury, 2012). For verification and validation of 
the modMFSM structure, compositional verification, software testing, and model 
checking are considered. These methods complement each other for full testing of the 
system as accuracy of the methods separately are limited by the chosen scenarios, and the 
defined specifications, respectively (Lipka, Paška, & Potužák, 2014). 
2.3.1 Compositional Verification 
The compositional verification algorithm for MFSM theory checks that the 
controller will not send any module into a “dump” state, proving that there are no 
compositional errors, conflicted responses are avoided, and each module satisfies its 
corresponding filters (Endsley, 2004). 
2.3.2 Simulation Testing 
Software testing is a method for validating that the system meets the ability 
requirements and works as desired. Definition of the specific scenarios for simulation 
“from analytical description is widely recognized in literature” (Lipka et al., 2014). 
Unlike model checking, which relies on searching the states of the discrete event system, 
simulation testing is less susceptible to scaling issues for large systems. Scenario-based 
evaluation also allows assessment of the system’s ability to handle situations that may not 
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be able to be tested through model checking (e.g. model checking does not force 
collisions to test a collision detection algorithm). 
2.3.3 Model Checking 
Model checking is used to prove adherence to desired system behavior. More 
specifically, model checkers search for violation of the specifications by providing 
counter-examples (Cassandras & Lafortune, 2011). To mitigate computational 
complexity of checking large systems, Hill et al. (R. C. Hill, Cury, de Queiroz, Tilbury, 
& Lafortune, 2010) show that “controllability and nonblocking of global systems [can be 
proven] through local checking” in hierarchical, modular systems without flattening the 
modules into a giant state machine, provided the system structure meets certain 
requirements, which are fully defined in (Richard Charles Hill, 2008). Additionally, 
through an evaluation of software testing versus software model checking, Beyer and 
Lemberger show that model checking can also efficiently identify bugs in the system 
(Beyer & Lemberger, 2017).  
Desired system behavior can be defined using formal specifications. Three main 
categories of formal specifications are:  
 Safety Specifications – to avoid illegal behavior. 
 Invariant Specifications – to meet requirements specific to the system state. 
 Liveness Specifications – to ensure absence of infinite loops, or to guarantee goal 
realization (Topcu, 2017). 
Although system specifications commonly fall in these three categories, there exist 
formal specifications outside these categories. 
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a formal language that uses Boolean atomic 
propositions to define formal specifications such that discrete event systems can be 
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checked for fulfillment of desired system behavior. Software tools such as SMV, 
NuSMV, and SPIN for checking systems against LTL specifications are well-developed 
and widely used (Cassandras & Lafortune, 2011). 
Although formal verification and validation is a vital step in proving the 
robustness and correctness of the model and software, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but will be the next step in future research. 
2.4 LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
Supervisory controllers for large, complex systems like drilling rigs and snubbing 
units require guaranteed safe coordination of equipment and processes. Supervisory 
control efforts in the oil and gas industry have made significant progress, but there is still 
a need for supervisory controllers that can provide modularity, and functional scalability.   
Supervisory controllers of event-driven discrete event systems are commonly 
modeled as FSMs, Petri nets, and MDPs. Choosing a model approach depends on the 
needs of the application. For large, complex systems like drilling rigs, it is beneficial to 
choose a model that can be decomposed into sub-systems, and maximizes decidability. 
Therefore, the MFSM architecture—which models large systems as a network of 
connected modules, each housing a subsystem modeled by trigger / response finite state 
machines—was used as the foundational structure on top of which modifications were 
made to meet the requirements for control of complex systems. 
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Chapter 3:  modMFSM — An Extended Structure of Modular Finite 
State Machine (MFSM) System 
Based on a reading of the literature and best industry practices, this research 
extends the modular finite state machine (MFSM) structure developed for reconfigurable 
machinery in the manufacturing industry, described in the previous chapter. The extended 
controller structure uses various models within modules, including guarded trigger / 
response finite state machines, in order to model a hierarchical supervisory control 
structure. The developed supervisory control structure (modMFSM) adapts to remote and 
on-site manual interventions, new equipment, collisions, and missing equipment. This 
section details the modular, supervisory controller architecture design.  
3.1 MODIFICATION TO TR FSMS IN MFSM STRUCTURE 
Endsley’s MFSM structure uses trigger / response finite state machines (TR 
FSMs) in the modules and filters. In the proposed modified structure, transitions are 
triggered by events and/or fulfilled guards, or conditions, to respond to changes in system 
and environment variables to ensure safety and procedural compliance. The use of guards 
for input/output state machines is not a novel concept as shown in (Y. L. Chen & Lin, 
2000), and have been applied to MFSMs through implementation of MFSMs as Event-
Condition-Action (ECA) systems (E. E. Almeida et al., 2007; E. T. Almeida, Luntz, & 
Tilbury, 2005). In ECA systems, a rule affects transitions such that when an event 
happens, if the condition is satisfied, then the actions are performed. Although this 
implementation allows for the application of conditions for transitions based on 
observations of the environment, the MFSMs as ECA systems restricts the structure of 
the MFSMs such that there must be a main module to which peripheral modules are 
attached. The peripheral modules are only attached to the main module, and therefore, 
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cannot communicate with each other. If this ECA system implementation were to be 
applied to drilling automation, the main module would control the drilling procedure, and 
the peripheral modules would represent the sub-systems and equipment. However, for 
drilling automation, this ECA system structure does not suffice as it does not allow event 
detection modules, such as collision detection, to interact with equipment in parallel to 
the main module that controls the drilling process. Therefore, to relax the structural 
requirement of ECA systems, yet implement conditional transitions for MFSMs, guard 
conditions are captured by modifying the finite state machine transition definition.  
 
𝜏 = (𝑡𝜏, 𝑐𝜏, 𝑥𝑠𝜏 , 𝑥𝑑𝜏 , 𝑟𝜏) 
 
where 
 
𝑡𝜏 = trigger for transition 
𝑐𝜏 = transition condition (e.g. 𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑  < 𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑) 
𝑥𝑠𝜏  = source state of the transition 
𝑥𝑑𝜏  = destination state of the transition 
𝑟𝜏 = {𝑟𝜏,1, … , 𝑟𝜏,𝑚𝑟} = sequence of responses as a result of the transition 
 
3.2 SYSTEM VARIABLES 
To allow for interaction of the supervisory controller with the environment for the 
guard conditions mentioned in the previous section, system variables are introduced to 
the MFSM architecture. These system variables are stored in a global database that can 
be accessed by all modules and filters in the system. The concept of using system 
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variables in conjunction with discrete event systems, including finite state machines and 
Petri nets, have been implemented previously in (Y. L. Chen & Lin, 2000; Gaudin & 
Deussen, 2007; Lennartson et al., 2014; Yang & Gohari, 2005). A particularly relevant 
piece of work is the incorporation of system variables with extended finite state machines 
in (Teixeira, Malik, Cury, & Queiroz, 2015). Incorporation of system variables in the 
modMFSM architecture allows modification of the system variables to be a responsive 
action in transitions. Therefore, the final definition of the transitions in the finite state 
machines is: 
 
𝜏 = (𝑡𝜏, 𝑐𝜏, 𝑥𝑠𝜏 , 𝑥𝑑𝜏 , 𝑟𝜏, 𝑟𝑠𝑦𝑠) 
 
where 
 
𝑡𝜏 = trigger for transition 
𝑐𝜏 = transition condition (e.g. 𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑  < 𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑) 
𝑥𝑠𝜏  = source state of the transition 
𝑥𝑑𝜏  = destination state of the transition 
𝑟𝜏 = {𝑟𝜏,1, … , 𝑟𝜏,𝑚𝑟} = set of responses as a result of the transition 
𝑟𝑠𝑦𝑠= {𝑟𝑠𝑦𝑠,1, … , 𝑟𝑠𝑦𝑠,𝑚𝑠𝑦𝑠} = set of modifications to system variables as a result of 
the transition 
3.3 MULTILEVEL HIERARCHY AND MODULE TYPES 
In the modMFSM controller structure, the modules are organized into eight 
categories for better understanding of each module’s role in the system, and to allow for 
easy categorization of modules into the appropriate levels for hierarchical control, which 
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is naturally supported by the modularity of the modMFSM structure. Hierarchical 
supervisory control has been explored for various discrete event systems, including for 
MFSM systems (R. C. Hill et al., 2010; Richard Charles Hill, 2008; Ngo & Seow, 2014). 
The modularity of the MFSM structure allows the controller hierarchy to be easily 
rearranged to fit the desired system. This hierarchical structure aids in reducing 
complexity of the subsystem controllers, and allows for more flexible controller and 
equipment modularity. 
 For systems similar to drilling rigs and snubbing units, four levels are considered: 
 Top Level – This level makes high-level decisions, and contains the Operator 
GUI Module, the System Coordinator Module, and the Meta Module. 
 Middle Level – This level coordinates sub-systems to reach operational goals, and 
contains the Operation Modules. The Operation Modules represent the 
operational modes of the system. 
 Low Level – This level of modules control the sub-systems directly, and contain 
the Equipment Controller Modules, Manual Modules, and Physics-Based / 
Algorithm Modules. 
 Sub Level – This is the lowest level of the hierarchy, and contains the Equipment 
Modules, which interact directly with the machinery. 
3.3.1 Operator GUI Module 
The Operator GUI Module represents the GUI interface with which the human 
operator interacts. The most basic function of the Operator GUI Module is to activate the 
system. There is only one Operator GUI Module per system. 
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3.3.2 System Coordinator Module 
The System Coordinator Module coordinates the operational goals for the system, 
and triggers the relevant Operational Module. 
3.3.3 Meta Module 
The Meta Module runs through detection of missing equipment and controllers by 
checking for disconnected sockets. If there is missing equipment or controllers, the Meta 
Module will automatically synthesize Manual Modules, and corresponding filters, 
sockets, and pipes to represent manual operator control of the system as replacements for 
missing equipment. This automatic synthesis procedure is in the simplest state, such that 
it allows multiple triggers, but only one response. Future research will be needed to 
develop an automatic synthesis algorithm that allows for multiple responses. Synthesis of 
discrete event systems controllers satisfying formally defined desired system behaviors is 
an ongoing and well established area of supervisory control research (Asarin, Maler, & 
Pnueli, 1994; Leduc, Dai, & Song, 2009; Malik & Teixeira, 2016; Thistle, 1996). 
However, the automatic generation of filters that correctly regulate interaction among 
modules has not been developed, but would alleviate the design effort needed and allow 
for more efficient controller reconfiguration. In his work, Hill has further investigated the 
construction of inter-module filters that satisfy global system properties; however, this 
algorithm requires designer input, but shows potential for implementation in a more 
sophisticated, automatic filter generation algorithm (Richard Charles Hill, 2008). 
3.3.4 Operation Modules 
The Operation Modules coordinate the activities of the sub-systems to reach the 
operational goal of the system as specified by the System Coordinator Module. Each 
Operation Module represents an operational mode of the system. For instance, an 
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automated drilling rig would have a tripping operational mode and a drilling operational 
mode, which would coordinate the running of pipe in and out of a well, and coordinate 
drilling the well, respectively. Each of these operational modes would be represented by a 
separate operation module to allow for isolated modification of operational procedures 
and sub-system involvement. 
3.3.5 Equipment Controller Modules 
These modules represent the supervisory controllers for sub-systems and 
coordinate the equipment activities. 
3.3.6 Equipment Modules 
This type of module models each piece of equipment, and send commands to the 
machinery. 
3.3.7 Manual Module 
The Manual Module encompasses a simple TR FSM that facilitates the transition 
of operations control between the supervisory controller and the human operator. The 
Manual Module is designed to be a versatile substitute for modules when a common error 
occurs that requires human intervention, or when operation modules, equipment 
controller modules, or equipment modules are missing. For instance, when the system 
identifies a piece of missing equipment, it creates a Manual Module that accepts triggers 
and produces a response as previously done by the missing equipment. Defined below is 
the framework for the TR FSM of a generic Manual Module that takes in one trigger and 
produces one response: 
 
𝐹𝑀 = (𝑋𝐹𝑀 ,  𝑇𝐹𝑀 ,  𝑅𝐹𝑀 ,  𝜏𝐹𝑀 , 𝑥0𝐹𝑀 ,  𝑥𝑑𝑝𝐹𝑀 ,  𝑋𝑀𝐹𝑀 ) 
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where 
 
𝑋𝐹𝑀 = {idle, manual_control} 
𝑇𝐹𝑀= {1.trigger, 2.auto} 
𝑅𝐹𝑀 = {1.response, 2.manual} 
𝜏𝐹𝑀 = {(1.trigger, [ ], idle, manual_control, [2.manual]), (2.auto, [ ], 
manual_control, idle, [1.response])} 
𝑥0𝑀 = idle 
𝑥𝑑𝑝𝑀 = dump 
𝑋𝑀𝑀 = idle 
 
Defined below and shown in Figure 1 is the generic Manual Module:  
 
𝑀 = (𝐹𝑀, {𝑆𝑀1 , 𝑆𝑀2 , 𝑆𝑀3 , 𝑆𝑀4}) 
where 
 
𝐹𝑀 = Described above. 
𝑆𝑀1 = {[1.trigger], [1.done]} 
𝑆𝑀2 = {[2.auto], [2.manual]} 
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Figure 1.  Generic Manual Module template. 
3.3.8 Physics-Based / Algorithm Modules 
A major advantage to using a module-based structure for building modular 
controllers is that the model type inside each module is not required to match the model 
types inside other modules as long as interaction requirements are met. For instance, one 
equipment module may encompass a trigger / response finite state machine while another 
equipment module hosts a Petri net. As long as the interior model is able to render the 
appropriate responses for the sockets of the module in order to interact with the other 
modules in the system, the choice of the interior model is only dependent on the purpose 
of the module. 
This is especially useful if the supervisory controller requires physics-based 
algorithms for action selection based on environment observation, for instance in the case 
of error detection, or collision detection. In order to avoid detected collisions, the 
approach to resolution of events created by the collision detection module is to create a 
priority queue for these events that would be resolved first when executing the controller. 
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The use of such physics-based algorithm modules will be explored in the snubbing case 
study through the inclusion of collision detection for safe coordination of equipment, as 
further described in Chapter 4:  Collision Detection. Although collision detection is the 
primary focus in this effort, the concept could be useful for other systems in the future. 
For example, on a drilling rig, close monitoring of cavings reveal important information 
about downhole conditions, which could trigger the need for a change in the operational 
conditions. A system is currently under development at the University of Texas at Austin 
to detect cavings at the mud shaker that utilizes a cuttings transport model (Han et al., 
2017). This system could be included in a drilling rig modular supervisory controller as a 
module similar to a collision detection module. 
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Chapter 4:  Collision Detection 
To ensure safe operations, the supervisory controller must coordinate the 
subsystems such that the moving machinery never collide. Collision detection has been a 
fundamental concept in controls research, and an ongoing investigation topic in robotics, 
and computer graphics and simulations. The ideal collision detection system would run in 
the background and interrupt the system as necessary to avoid collision. This chapter 
discusses the collision detection approaches considered when designing the supervisory 
controller for the simplified case study system and for drilling. 
In the proposed supervisory control framework, collision detection is 
implemented as a physics-based algorithm module, which interacts with the operation 
level module and the relevant equipment modules in the relevant subsystem. The 
collision detection module interacts with the other modules such that when a potential 
collision is detected, it will send commands to stop movement of equipment, store the 
current states of the equipment and operation modules, send commands to a collision 
resolution module for relocation of equipment to avoid collision, and return the 
equipment to the stored current state such that the original process can be resumed.  
Out of the many developed collision detection algorithms, three general types of 
collision detection algorithms were explored when designing the supervisory controller 
for the simplified case study and for drilling: 
 Heuristic Collision Detection 
 Bounding Boxes Collision Detection 
 B-Spline Surface Collision Detection  
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4.1 HEURISTIC COLLISION DETECTION 
The heuristic approach simply restricts the movement of each piece of equipment 
dependent on the location of other active equipment. These relationships must be defined 
during the design of the model inside the collision detection module prior to 
implementation. For instance, in the case of snubbing operations, if the tongs are 
extended, then a minimum safe height is defined for the elevator, leaving a margin of 
distance before collision with the extended tongs, such that if the elevator reaches this 
minimum height, movement is stopped and the tongs moved out of the way before the 
elevator is allowed to resume descending. Although this is a relatively simple approach, it 
is not flexible to the addition or replacement of equipment. Bounding boxes is a more 
adaptive approach. 
4.2 BOUNDING BOX COLLISION DETECTION 
The widely used bounding box collision detection approach approximates the 
volume of each piece of equipment by considering an invisible box surrounding the 
equipment. If the bounding boxes of two objects overlap, then there is a possibility of 
collision. Common variations of the bounding box approximation are: axis-aligned 
bounding box (AABB), spheres, and oriented bounding box (OBB) (Kockara, Halic, 
Iqbal, Bayrak, & Rowe, 2007). Bounding box collision detection is another algorithm that 
can be included in the collision detection module for snubbing operations, chosen for its 
ability to adapt better to general shapes than other algorithms such as simplex-based or 
feature-based (Kockara et al., 2007). 
For the case study in this report, ABB, where the sides of the rectangular 
bounding box align with the principal axis, which allow for accommodation of deforming 
objects, was implemented (Jiménez, Thomas, & Torras, 2001). Therefore, various 
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reference frames were defined to locate and orient the bounding boxes. A global 
reference frame was established at a central location. Each piece of equipment had a local 
reference frame attached to the center of the piece of equipment, and the equipment’s 
bounding box was defined with respect to the local reference frame. All equipment 
movement was then calculated with respect to the global reference frame, which allowed 
detection of overlapping bounding boxes prior to the occurrence of a collision.   
Since calibration of sensors is beyond the scope of the controller design this 
method is dependent on the assumption that the local reference frames of the equipment 
are properly calibrated with the origin of the global reference frame prior to 
commencement of operations. 
4.3 B-SPLINE SURFACE COLLISION DETECTION 
B-spline surfaces are able to approximate complex shapes more closely than 
polyhedral approximations. For B-spline approximations, it is possible to calculate 
minimum distance between B-spline surfaces for collision detection (Chang, Choi, Kim, 
& Wang, 2011). Although this type of collision detection provides more freedom of 
movement for the equipment and is less conservative, it requires knowledge of the 
specific geometry of the equipment. Exploration of this level of collision detection is 
outside the scope of this project. 
4.4 DYNAMIC OBJECT DISCOVERY COLLISION DETECTION 
Although the purpose of this supervisory controller is to track the location of the 
components of the controlled system, there can still exist components within the system 
workspace for which the locations are unknown. This occurs when unmodeled objects 
enter the workspace at uncertain times and frequencies. For instance, in a snubbing unit, 
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there remains a risk of human crew members entering the rig floor at uncertain points 
which could lead to collisions. Dynamically discovering objects that move in and out of 
the workspace can be performed via various sensors with possible combination with real-
time image processing of cameras monitoring the environment. Dynamic object 
recognition and position detection has been extensively explored in robotics (S. Y. Chen, 
2012). The idea of using image processing for drilling rig activity recognition is a new 
area of research in the oil and gas industry and can be leveraged for dynamic object 
discovery collision detection (Hegde, Awan, & Wiemers, 2018). Although this is a 
valuable path for exploration in future research efforts, this approach to collision 
detection calculation is beyond the scope of this effort. 
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Chapter 5:  Case Study—Simple Conveyor Belt Drilling System 
As a proof of concept, the modMFSM controller architecture was applied to a 
simple conveyor belt drilling system. The conveyor belt drilling system is formatted to 
demonstrate the controller's hierarchical structure, inclusion of physics-based models, 
modularity, and automatic generation of manual modules and corresponding filters. This 
section describes the simple conveyor belt drilling system, the design of its modular 
supervisory controller, and simulations of the implemented controller. 
5.1 DEFINITION OF SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT 
In order to design any controller, a model of the plant system and a thorough 
definition of the expected behaviors of the controlled system are necessary. This section 
defines the system components, process narrative, and assumptions needed to design a 
supervisory controller for a simple conveyor belt drilling system. 
5.1.1 System Components 
Identification of the hardware needed for automation of all activities is a critical 
step for designing a controller for coordination of equipment and processes. The 
conveyor belt drilling system contains two pieces of equipment: a drill robot, and a 
conveyor belt. Figure 2 presents a diagram of the conveyor belt drilling system. 
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Figure 2.  Diagram of the conveyor belt drilling system as used in the case study. The 
global reference frame is shown in red in the diagram with the y-axis 
coming out of the page.  
Positions of the equipment and blocks to be drilled are relative to a global 
reference frame with an origin set at the base of the drill robot with the positive x-axis 
extending to the right of the robot, the positive y-axis extending through the front of the 
robot, and the positive z-axis extending up through the top of the robot. The drill arm and 
drill bit portion of the drill robot extends 0.1 m in the positive y-direction away from the 
base. The drill has a fixed x- and y- position, but can move up and down in the z-
direction at 0.025 m/s. Additionally, when turned on, the drill bit rotates at 250 RPM 
about the z-axis. The conveyor belt lies 0.1 m in the positive y-direction, parallel to the x-
axis. The conveyor moves blocks at 0.025 m/s in the negative x-direction. 
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In order to fully automate a system, appropriate sensors are crucial to provide 
controllers with feedback from the system and environment in order to best respond to 
events. The following sensors exist in the conveyor belt drilling system: 
 Position sensor for the drill (positions of the bit can be calculated from the drill 
position) 
 Linear velocity sensor for the drill  
 Rotational velocity sensor for the drill bit 
 Position sensor for the blocks 
 Linear velocity sensor for the blocks 
5.1.2 Process Narrative 
A process narrative is the step-by-step action and decision-making procedures for 
particular operations. This documentation is essential for a thorough understanding of the 
work process in order to build a controller that guides the system through the correct flow 
of operations, while maintaining safety. Figure 3 shows the process narrative as a 
flowchart for drilling a block using the conveyor belt drilling system. In this flowchart, 
the yellow boxes represent a deciding factor for the next action. Although a collision 
detection process is not shown on the flowchart, it runs in the background, interrupting 
the main process if a collision is detected.  
 
 35 
 
Figure 3.  Process narrative flowchart for drilling a block in the simple conveyor belt 
drilling system. 
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5.1.3 Assumptions 
Supervisory controllers work in highly dynamic and complex environments. 
When designing controllers, it may be necessary to make various assumptions about the 
system and environment in order to simplify the control structure to address events that 
are most likely to occur. Some of these assumptions may need to be addressed for 
improvement on the controller performance. However, work on resolving those 
assumptions is out of the scope of this project.   
For the simple conveyor belt drilling system case study, the following are 
assumed:  
 Global positions of each block are given by some sensor. 
 The workspace is defined as 𝑥 = [−1.5 𝑚, 1.5 𝑚]. Addition and removal of 
blocks from the workspace is assumed to be on an infinite conveyor belt such that 
when a block reaches 𝑥 = 1.5 𝑚, it is considered to have left the workspace and a 
new block is added at 𝑥 = −1.5 𝑚.  
 Velocities of the drill robot and the conveyor belt are maintained at constant set 
points. Ramp up and ramp down times are negligible. 
 Movement of the drill robot and the conveyor belt has no friction. 
 No force or torque control is used for drilling. 
 Sensors work in perfect condition without malfunctions or communication loss. 
Sensors are perfectly calibrated. 
 Humans will not interrupt operations when the supervisory controller is in control. 
5.2 CONVEYOR BELT DRILLING SYSTEM CONTROLLER 
A 4-tier modMFSM controller was built for the conveyor belt drilling system. 
Since this system is only for feasibility proof of concept, a GUI was not built; therefore, 
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the Operator GUI Module was not used in the controller. Similarly, to minimize 
controller complexity for this simple system which only has one operational mode, the 
duties of the System Coordinator Module was incorporated into the Meta Module as 
shown in Figure 4. The controller includes two Operation Modules for the drilling 
process and collision resolution. There are two Equipment Controller Modules, the drill 
robot controller, and the conveyor belt controller, which command the drill robot and 
conveyor belt Equipment Modules, respectively. Collision detection for the drill robot 
and the blocks are included as the sole Physics-Based / Algorithm Module in the 
controller. The full design of the supervisory controller for the case study can be found in 
Appendix B – Case Study Controller Design. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Meta Module for the conveyor belt drilling system. 
5.3 COLLISION DETECTION AND RESOLUTION 
The axis-aligned bounding box method was implemented for collision detection 
for the drill robot and the blocks in the workspace. The bounding boxes extended 0.025 
m past the outermost parts of the components. The bounding box for the drill robot was 
split into two boxes: one for the drill arm, and one for the drill bit. The drill bit bounding 
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box was activated only when the conveyor belt moving to allow the drill bit bounding 
box to overlap with the bounding box of a block while raising and lowering the drill 
robot, and while drilling. Each block in the workspace had its own bounding box. 
A collision was detected if the bounding boxes overlapped. The condition to be 
checked is as follows: 
 
(𝐶𝐵. 𝑓𝑠𝑚. 𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑟 == ′𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔′  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 (((𝑎𝑛𝑦(2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑋𝐵 − 𝑋𝐷𝑅) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑋 + 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑋)  
𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑦(2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑋_𝐵_𝐷𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑋_𝐷𝑅) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑋 + 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑋)) 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 (2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑌𝐵 − 𝑌𝐷𝑅) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑌 + 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑌) 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 (2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑍𝐵 −  𝑍𝐷𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑍 + 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑍))  
𝑜𝑟 (𝑎𝑛𝑦(2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑋𝐵 − 𝑋𝐵𝐼𝑇) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑋 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑋)  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 (2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑌𝐵 − 𝑌𝐵𝐼𝑇) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑌 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑌) 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 (2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑍𝐵 −  𝑍𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑍 + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑍))))  
𝑜𝑟 (𝐶𝐵. 𝑓𝑠𝑚. 𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑟! = ′𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔′ 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 ((𝑎𝑛𝑦(2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑋𝐵 − 𝑋𝐷𝑅) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑋 + 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑋)  
𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑦(2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑋𝐵𝐷𝑂𝑁𝐸 − 𝑋𝐷𝑅) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑋 + 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑋))  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 (2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑌𝐵 − 𝑌𝐷𝑅) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑌 + 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑌)  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 (2 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑍𝐵 −  𝑍𝐷𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅) ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑍 + 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑍)) 
 
where 
 
𝐶𝐵. 𝑓𝑠𝑚. 𝑥𝑐𝑢𝑟 = current state of the Conveyor Belt (CB) Finite State Machine 
(FSM) 
𝑋𝐵, 𝑌𝐵, 𝑍𝐵 = x, y, and z positions of the blocks 
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𝑋𝐵𝐷𝑂𝑁𝐸 = x position of the blocks that have been drilled 
𝑋𝐵𝐼𝑇, 𝑌𝐵𝐼𝑇 , 𝑍𝐵𝐼𝑇 = x, y, and z positions of the drill bit 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑋 , 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑌 , 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑍  = length of the bounding box of each block in 
the x, y, and z directions 
𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑋 , 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑌 , 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑍 = length of the bounding box of the drill robot in the x, y, 
and z directions 
𝑍𝐷𝑅𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅 = z position of the center of the drill robot 
𝑍𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅 = z position of the center of the drill bit 
 
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION 
The conveyor belt drilling system and controller were implemented in Python 
3.6.5 from Anaconda, Inc. Simulations as described in Section 5.5 Simulations were run 
on an Intel® Core™ i7-7500U (2.70GHz) processor. 
The modMFSM events (triggers and responses), finite state machines, sockets, 
modules, filters, pipes, and system of modules were implemented using Python classes. 
The event class was created to define each trigger and response event. Each event object 
contains the following attributes:  
 Name of the event object, stored as a string 
 Socket through which the event enters or exits, stored as a socket object 
 Event name without the socket prefix, stored as a string 
 Finite state machine contained by the module in which the event occurs , stored as 
an fsm object 
The fsm class defines the finite state machines for the modules and filters. The 
attributes of each fsm object are listed below: 
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 Name of the fsm object, stored as a string 
 Finite set of states, stored as a list of strings 
 Finite set of trigger events, stored as a list of event objects 
 Finite set of response events, stored as a list of event objects 
 Finite set of transitions, stored as a tuple of tuples, in which each tuple represents 
a transition and contains the trigger event object, transition condition string, 
source state string, destination state string, set of response event objects, and set of 
system variable changes stored as a tuple of strings 
 Initial state, stored as a string 
 Dump state, stored as a string 
 Marked states, stored as a list of strings 
 Current state, stored as a string 
 Saved state, stored as a string 
The socket class represents the sockets found on the modules. Each socket object 
represents each individual socket with the following attributes: 
 Name of the socket object, stored as a string 
 Finite set of trigger names without the socket prefix, stored as a list of strings 
 Finite set of response names without the socket prefix, stored as a list of strings 
The modMFSM modules are represented by the module class, for which each 
object has the following attributes: 
 Name of the module object, stored as a string 
 Finite state machine contained in the module, stored as an fsm object 
 Finite set of sockets in the module, stored as a list of socket objects 
The filters class, which represents the modMFSM filters, is similar in structure to 
the module class. Each filters object has the following attributes: 
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 Name of the filters object, stored as a string 
 Finite state machine contained in the filter, stored as an fsm object 
 Socket A, stored as a socket object 
 Socket B, stored as a socket object 
The pipe class defines the modMFSM pipe which connects modules. Each pipe 
object has the below attributes: 
 Name of the pipe object, stored as a string 
 Socket A, stored as a socket object 
 Socket B, stored as a socket object 
 Filter on the pipe object, stored as a filters object 
The last class created for implementation of the modMFSM structure was the 
systemOfModules class which defines the system of modules, filters, and pipes that make 
up the supervisory controller. Each systemOfModules object includes the following 
attributes: 
 Name of the systemOfModules object, stored as a string 
 Finite set of modules in the system, stored as a list of module objects 
 Finite set of filters in the system, stored as a list of filters objects 
 Finite set of pipes in the system, stored as a list of pipe objects 
System variables were stored globally to allow access for all functions. Changes 
to the system variables as a result of transitions were stored in the definition of the 
transitions as a set of strings, e.g. the “ CHECK_DONE = ‘True’ ” string indicated that 
after the corresponding transition, the variable CHECK_DONE will be set to True. Since 
this action was stored as a string, execution of the action was done with Python’s exec 
function. Similarly, the conditions for transitions were stored as strings and evaluated 
using Python’s eval function. In addition to the system variables, two lists of event 
 42 
objects were stored globally. These lists were the queues for the event triggers in the 
main system operations, and the event triggers for collision detection and collision 
resolution, respectively.  
In order to allow the collision detection module to interrupt operations in the 
event of a possible collision, threading was used to implement two threads: one for the 
main operations, and one for the collision detection algorithm. This allowed the collision 
detection algorithm to run in the background to check for collisions, and interrupt the 
main thread as necessary. The algorithms in both threads are situated inside while loops 
that run while the Boolean CONTINUE variable is true. This allows the code to terminate 
the threads once a termination condition has been met. It is expected that if more Physics-
Based / Algorithm Modules are added to the modMFSM controller, a new thread would 
be implemented for each physics-based module that requires interruption of the main 
operations. 
The main operations thread runs the transitions of the system. Inside the while 
loop of the main operations thread, an if statement around the main operations code 
checks if the Boolean COLLISION variable is true, indicating whether there is a potential 
collision. The main operations algorithm only runs if COLLISION is false, so that if a 
possible collision exists, the controller will suspend motion in the system until the 
collision is resolved. If there is no collision, the main operations thread first calls an 
update_system function. This function updates the system variables for simulation 
purposes. (For implementation of a controller that interacts with a live system, the 
update_system function would not be necessary.) After the system variables are updated, 
the algorithm checks for transitions that have no trigger event but have been triggered by 
a change in system variables, and adds response events to the main operations queue. 
After resolving these transitions, the algorithm pops the next event off the main 
 43 
operations event queue, searches the system for the transition triggered by the event, 
updates the relevant finite state machine state, adds response events to the main 
operations event queue, and updates relevant system variables as necessary. The 
algorithm then returns to the beginning of the while loop code. 
The collision detection thread checks for potential collisions in the background 
while the main operations thread runs. In order to check for collisions using the most up-
to-date positions and velocities of the equipment, the collision detection thread first calls 
the update_system function to update the system variables. Then, the code checks for 
collisions per the condition described in Section 5.3 Collision Detection and Resolution. 
If a collision is detected, the Boolean COLLISION variable is set to True, the current 
state of all modules are saved, motion is suspended, and the collision is resolved per the 
collision resolution module. Events from the collision detection and collision resolution 
algorithms are stored in a collision event queue to keep them separate from the events of 
the main operations. Once the collision has been resolved, the modules are returned to 
their saved states, the COLLISION variable is set to False, and main operations are 
resumed. 
5.5 SIMULATIONS 
Preliminary testing of the modular supervisory controller concept feasibility 
focused on simulation testing, the following three simulation cases were implemented: 
 Error-Free Operations 
 Forced Collision 
 Missing Conveyor Belt Machine 
Since a GUI was not created for the simplified case study system, the Meta 
Module initial state was set to be “system_check” and an initial event of ME_2_check 
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was added to the main operations event queue to simulate a GUI starting the system. 
Additionally, a time limit was added to the execution of the code to allow for termination 
in case of an infinite loop. 
Prior to implementation of the modMFSM structure on a larger, more complex 
system for snubbing operations, compositional verification will need to be done, and LTL 
system requirements will need to be defined for formal verification via model checking. 
The expected transitions and output of the simulation code for the simulation cases can be 
found in Appendix C – Case Study Simulation Transitions and Code Output. 
5.5.1 Case 1: Error-Free Operations 
This simulation case runs the system through error-free operations of drilling 
three blocks. "Error-free" here means that the system is expected to follow the process 
narrative without collisions or malfunctioning machinery. The Case 1 simulation ran in 
89.9 seconds.  
5.5.2 Case 2: Forced Collision 
This simulation case tests the ability of the collision detection module to identify 
a potential collision and interrupt the main operations to resolve the potential collision. 
The initial positions of the drill robot and blocks in the workspace were set such that the 
bounding boxes of the drill robot arm and a block overlap, forcing a potential collision to 
be detected. In Case 2, only one block was to be drilled. The Case 2 simulation ran in 
21.2 seconds.  
5.5.3 Case 3: Missing Conveyor Belt Machine 
The third simulation case tests the ability of the controller to detect disconnected 
sockets of a piece of missing equipment and automatically generate manual modules for 
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replacement. To do so, the code for the conveyor belt related classes were commented 
out. For simplicity, manual intervention was simulated by a three second pause and 
manipulation of the system variables to give the appearance that a human had added or 
removed a block from the workspace. Three blocks were expected to be drilled in Case 3. 
The simulation of Case 3 successfully detected the missing conveyor belt, and 
created two manual modules: one for the normal operations of the conveyor belt, and one 
for the collision detection commands for the conveyor belt. The simulation ran for 45.2 
seconds.  
5.6 CASE STUDY RESULTS SUMMARY 
The successful simulations of the three test cases show promise for feasibility of 
the modMFSM controller structure, but a full verification for compositional and formal 
correctness is necessary to complete the validation and verification process.  
Some observations were of the controller implementation that must be considered 
when implementing on a larger, more complex system. Selection of set points for 
machinery velocity and bounding box margins are dependent on program run time. The 
time between the detection of a potential collision and the collision happening must not 
be less than the time needed for the process to halt the moving parts once a potential 
collision is detected. Additionally, a forced delay was needed in the main thread to allow 
the collision detection thread to run its check before the next action occurs. The duration 
of the delay can be optimized depending on the program run time and equipment machine 
limits. 
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Chapter 6:  Extension of modMFSM to Snubbing Operations 
This section describes the proposed approach for implementation of the modified 
modular supervisory controller to snubbing operations. 
6.1 DEFINITION OF SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT 
In order to design any controller, a model of the plant system and a thorough 
definition of the expected behaviors of the controlled system are necessary. Section 6.2 
Process Narrative defines the process narrative, system components, system 
requirements, and environment assumptions for the case of designing a supervisory 
controller for snubbing operations. In addition to referencing available literature on 
snubbing like Grace (2003) and Prebeau-Menezes (2013), documentation of system and 
environment definitions was completed thanks to the permission of Superior Energy 
Services, Inc. to visit one of their mechanized snubbing standalone units. With 
permission from Superior Energy Services, Inc., information was gathered through: 
 Video and photograph recordings of operations 
 Manually recorded notes of operations and crew practices 
 Interviews with the crew 
6.2 PROCESS NARRATIVE 
A process narrative is the step-by-step action and decision-making procedures for 
particular operations. This documentation is essential for a thorough understanding of the 
work process in order to build a controller that guides the system through the correct flow 
of operations, while maintaining safety.  
For ease of understanding, the snubbing operations process narrative is 
represented in a series of flowcharts. Shown below is the flowchart created for the 
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snubbing out and stripping out process for a mechanized snubbing rig. In this flowchart, 
the yellow boxes represent a deciding factor for the next action. The blue boxes indicate 
that action requires a procedure represented by its own flowchart in the series, which 
shares the name as the action in the blue box. The full series of flowcharts for snubbing 
operations can be found in Appendix D – Process Narrative Flowcharts for Snubbing. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Process narrative flowchart for snubbing / stripping out pipe. 
 48 
6.3 SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Documenting the process narrative also allows for identification of the hardware 
needed for automation of all activities, which is a critical step for designing a controller 
for coordination of equipment and processes.  
Appendices 
Appendix A – Snubbing Unit Equipment describes general equipment and 
machinery for snubbing units, which exist as both standalone and rig-assist units. For the 
purpose of this case study, a mechanized, standalone snubbing unit is considered. 
However, the proposed supervisory controller structure is designed to be adaptable to all 
types of rigs, accommodating for various equipment combinations.  
In order to fully automate a system, appropriate sensors are crucial to provide 
controllers with feedback from the system and environment in order to best respond to 
events. Table 1 shows the sensors necessary to automate bringing new pipe to the well 
center for snubbing operations. From the table, it can be seen that at least twelve sensors 
are needed for autonomously bringing new pipe to the well center. A full table of sensors 
needed for automating snubbing can be found in Appendix E – Snubbing Automation 
Sensors. From left to right, the columns describe the variable observed, whether sensor 
hardware exists and its type, suggested sensor hardware if not already available, and the 
current sensing method for the variable. 
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Table 1.  System variables and corresponding sensors for bringing new pipe to the well 
center. 
Variable Sensor Hardware 
Suggested 
Hardware 
Current 
Method 
Stabbing Plate Alignment None Camera 
Visual / 
Manual 
Well Pressure Casing Pressure Gauge N/A Sensor 
Joint Counter None 
N/A (Build 
into controller) 
Visual / 
Manual 
Height of Pipe for 
Connection 
Block Position N/A 
Sensor 
Elevator Position 
Visual / 
Manual 
Elevator Closed on Pipe 
Built-In Open/Close 
Indicator 
N/A 
Visual / 
Manual 
Catwalk Height 
Built-In Sensor (Possible 
Limit Switch) 
N/A Sensor 
Elevator Height at Pipe None Camera 
Visual / 
Manual 
Catcher's Mitt 
(Extended/Retracted) 
Built-In Indicator 
(Existence Uncertain) 
N/A 
Visual / 
Manual 
Tongs 
(Extended/Retracted) 
Built-In Indicator - Well 
center is set point 
N/A Sensor 
Pipe in Catcher's Mitt None 
Contact or 
Proximity 
Sensor 
Visual / 
Manual 
Tongs Torque Built-In Torque Sensor N/A Sensor 
Pipe End in Catwalk 
None 
Catwalk 
Camera 
Visual / 
Manual 
Pipe in Skate Basket 
Visual / 
Manual 
Tongs Dies Failure Built-In Torque Sensor;  
Motor rotation encoder on 
pipe 
N/A 
Sensor 
Connection Made 
Sensor / 
Visual 
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6.4 FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
As described in Section 2.3.3 Model Checking, an important step in the design 
process of a controller is to specify the desired behavior of the controlled system. Since 
linear temporal logic (LTL) specifications work well with finite state machines for model 
checking and contract-based design, required system behaviors are defined by LTL 
specifications. Table 2 displays LTL specifications for operations for bringing new pipe 
to the well center. This specific operational mode focuses primarily on safety 
specifications. A table of all formal specifications for snubbing operations can be found 
in Appendix F – Snubbing Automation Formal Specifications.  
These formal specifications will also be defined through creation of contracts to 
specify the dependencies among modules to ensure safe operations. Formal specifications 
that are specific to a procedure or equipment modeled inside a module by a finite state 
machine will be used for model checking. 
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Table 2.  Formal specifications for system requirements in operations for bringing new 
pipe to the well center. 
Type Requirement Behavior Linear Temporal Logic 
Safety 
Snubbing Jack Height <= Maximum 
Safe Jack Height 
G (Jack_Height < Max_Jack_Safe_Height) 
Safety 
Snubbing Jack Height >= Minimum 
Safe Jack Height 
G (Jack_Height > Min_Jack_Safe_Height) 
Safety Do not close empty RAMs G (RAM_empty -> RAM_open) 
Safety 
Do not close slips on a tool or 
connection 
G (((Jack_Height < Tool_Joint_Max) ^ 
(Jack_Height > Tool_Joint_Min)) -> Slips_Open) 
Safety 
If catcher's mitt or tongs extended, 
elevator position must be above 
safe lower limit, and snubbing jack 
must be at the minimum safe jack 
height. 
G ((Mitt_Extended v Tongs_Extended) -> 
((Elevator_Height >= Safe_Lower_Limit) ^ 
(Jack_Height = Min_Jack_Safe_Height))) 
Safety 
If elevator position below safe 
lower limit or snubbing jack above 
safe lower limit, catcher's mitt and 
tongs must be retracted. 
G (((Elevator_Height < Safe_Lower_Limit) v 
(Jack_Height >Min_Jack_Safe_Height)) -> 
(!Mitt_Extended ^ !Tongs_Extended)) 
Safety 
If snubbing jack not at safe lower 
limit, elevator position must be 
above safe lower limit, and catwalk 
cannot push up pipe. 
G ((Jack_Height > Min_Jack_Safe_Height) -> 
((Elevator_Height > Safe_Lower_Limit) ^ 
(Skate_Basket < Max_Skate_Height))) 
Safety 
Elevator height should always 
remain more than a margin above 
the snubbing jack height. 
G (Elevator_Height > Jack_Height + Margin) 
Safety 
If connection made or connection 
not broken, catcher's mitt must not 
be extended. 
G ((Connection_Made v !Connection_Broken) -
> !Mitt_Extended) 
6.5 SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT ASSUMPTIONS 
Supervisory controllers work in highly dynamic and complex environments. 
When designing controllers, it may be necessary to make various assumptions about the 
system and environment in order to simplify the control structure to address events that 
are most likely to occur. Some of these assumptions may need to be addressed for 
improvement on the controller performance. However, work on resolving those 
assumptions is out of the scope of this project.  
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For the snubbing case study, the following are assumed: 
 Sensors will work in perfect condition without malfunctions or communication 
loss. 
 Sensors are perfectly calibrated. 
 Missing sensors for required variables (e.g. stabbing alignment) exist.  
 Snubbing personnel are situationally aware. Should manual control be necessary 
at any time, the crew will respond promptly and appropriately. 
 Snubbing personnel will not interrupt operations when the supervisory controller 
is in control. 
As the case study is simulated, new assumptions and restrictions on equipment ability 
may need to be added in order to reduce controller complexity and computational effort. 
6.6 DEFINITION OF MODULAR CONTROLLER STRUCTURE FOR SNUBBING AUTOMATION 
Since the proposed modMFSM structure encompasses controllers in modules that 
can represent system or equipment controllers, the MFSM structure naturally allows for 
hierarchical control. The modularity of the MFSM structure allows the controller 
hierarchy to be easily rearranged to fit the desired system. This hierarchical structure aids 
in reducing complexity of the subsystem controllers, and allows for more flexible 
controller and equipment modularity.  
As shown in Figure 6, the snubbing operations modMFSM supervisory controller 
modules are comprised of the same module types as used for the simplified conveyor belt 
drilling system controller, albeit with the addition of the Operator GUI Module, and the 
System Coordinator Module. For snubbing operations, control is split into four primary 
levels as described in Section 3.3 Multilevel Hierarchy and Module Types: 
 Top Level 
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 Middle Level 
 Low Level  
 Sub Level 
 These levels are reviewed in the next subsections with examples from the snubbing 
controller.  
 
Figure 6.  Comparison of the modules for the conveyor belt drilling system with those for 
snubbing operations. 
6.6.1 Top Level 
The Top Level of control is the highest level of control in the structure and 
consists of the Operator GUI Module, the System Coordinator Module that selects the 
mode of operation in which the system is currently operation (e.g. Snubbing In Pipe 
Heavy (SIPH), Snubbing New Pipe (SNP), etc.), and the Meta Module.  Figure 7 shows 
how the System Coordinator module interacts with the Meta Module and modules from 
the Middle Level of control. 
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Figure 7.  High-level diagram of interaction between the System Coordinator Module, 
Meta Module, and Operation Modules. 
6.6.2 Middle Level 
Like many complex operations, snubbing operations can be divided into sub-
operations, which will be referred to as operation modes, each of which follows different 
procedures and requires a different set of equipment. Operation modes are independent of 
each other; therefore, only one operation mode is active at a time, which simplifies the 
controller by reducing the tracked states to those associated with the processes and 
equipment of the active operation mode. The Middle Level of control consists of the 
modules which control the procedures of each operation mode, sending commands to the 
relevant equipment controllers in its subsystem and reacting to subsystem and 
environment events. The following is the definition of the guarded, trigger / response 
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finite state machine for the Snubbing New Pipe Operation Module (SNP), which controls 
bringing new pipe from the racked position to the well center as shown in Figure 8: 
 
𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃 = (𝑋𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃 ,  𝑇𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃 ,  𝑅𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃 ,  𝜏𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃 , 𝑥0𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃
,  𝑥𝑑𝑝𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃
,  𝑋𝑀𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃
) 
 
where 
 
𝑋𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃 = {inactive, prep_catchers_mitt, prep_tongs, prep_bails, prep_elevator, 
new_pipe, grab_pipe, extend_catchers_mitt, extend_tongs, lift_pipe, 
pipe_to_catchers_mitt, error, pipe_to_conn_height, check_alignment, 
stab_pipe, connection} 
𝑇𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃= {1.new_pipe, 2.extend_done, 2.retract_done, 3.retract_done, 
3.extend_done, 3.open_done, 3.close_done, 3.stop_done, 
4.new_pipe_ready, 5.extend_done, 5.retract_done, 
5.make_connection_done, 6.error_done, 6.fix_alignment} 
𝑅𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃  = {1.new_pipe_ready, 2.extend, 2.retract, 3.retract, 3.extend, 3.open, 
3.close, 3.raise, 3.lower, 3.stop, 4.new_pipe, 5.extend, 5.retract, 
5.make_connection, 6.error_done, 6.align_fixed} 
𝜏𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃  = {(1.new_pipe, [ ], inactive, prep_catchers_mitt, [2.retract], [ ]), 
(2.retract_done, [ ], prep_catchers_mitt, prep_tongs, [5.retract] , [ ]), 
(5.retract_done, [ ], prep_tongs, prep_bails, [3.retract] , [ ]), 
(3.retract_done, [ ], prep_bails, prep_elevator, [3.open] , [ ]), 
(3.open_done, H_elev==H_elev_pipe, prep_elevator, new_pipe, 
[3.stop] , [ ]), 
([ ], H_elev==H_elev_pipe, prep_elevator, new_pipe, [3.stop] , [ ]), 
(3.open_done, H_elev<H_elev_pipe, prep_elevator, prep_elevator, 
[3.raise] , [ ]), 
(3.open_done, H_elev>H_elev_pipe, prep_elevator, prep_elevator, 
[3.lower] , [ ]), 
(3.stop_done, [ ], new_pipe, new_pipe, [4.new_pipe] , [ ]), 
(4.new_pipe_ready, [ ], new_pipe, grab_pipe, [3.extend] , [ ]), 
(3.extend_done, [ ], grab_pipe, grab_pipe, [3.close] , [ ]),  
(3.close_done, [ ], grab_pipe, extend_catchers_mitt, [2.extend] , [ ]), 
(2.extend_done, [ ], extend_catchers_mitt, extend_tongs, [5.extend] , 
[ ]), 
(5.extend_done, [ ], extend_tongs, lift_pipe, [3.raise] , [ ]),  
([ ], H_elev == H_elev_clear_CW, lift_pipe, lift_pipe, [3.stop] , [ ]), 
(3.stop_done, [ ], lift_pipe, lift_pipe, [3.retract] , [ ]),  
(3.retract_done, [ ], lift_pipe, pipe_to_catchers_mitt, [ ] , [ ]), 
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([ ], pipe_catchers_mitt==false, pipe_to_catchers_mitt, error, [6.error] , 
[ ]), 
(6.error_done, error, pipe_to_catchers_mitt, [ ] , [ ]), 
([ ], pipe_catchers_mitt==true, pipe_to_catchers_mitt, 
pipe_to_catchers_mitt, [2.retract] , [ ]), 
(2.retract_done, pipe_to_catchers_mitt, check_alignment, [ ] , [ ]), 
([ ], aligned==false, check_alignment, check_alignment, 
[6.fix_alignment] , [ ]), 
(6.align_fixed, check_alignment, check_alignment, [ ] , [ ]), 
([ ], aligned == true && H_elev>H_elev_conn, check_alignment, 
pipe_to_conn_height, [3.lower] , [ ]), 
([ ], aligned == true && H_elev<H_elev_conn, check_alignment, 
pipe_to_conn_height, [3.raise] , [ ]), 
([ ], aligned == true && H_elev==H_elev_conn, check_alignment, 
pipe_to_conn_height, [3.stop] , [ ]), 
([ ], H_elev<H_elev_conn, pipe_to_conn_height, pipe_to_conn_height, 
[3.raise] , [ ]), 
 ([ ], stabbed==true && H_elev==H_elev_conn,pipe_to_conn_height, 
connection, [3.stop] , [ ]), 
(3.stop_done, [ ], connection, connection, [5.make_connection] , [ ]), 
(5.connect_done, [ ], connection, inactive, [1.new_pipe_ready] , [ ])} 
𝑥0𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃
 = inactive 
𝑥𝑑𝑝𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃
 = dump 
𝑋𝑀𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃
 = inactive 
 
Defined below is the Operation Module for Snubbing New Pipe:  
 
𝑆𝑁𝑃 = (𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃 , {𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃1 , 𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃2 , 𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃3 , 𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃4 , 𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃5 , 𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃6 }) 
where 
 
𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃 = Described above. 
𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃1  = {[1.new_pipe], [1.new_pipe_ready]} 
𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃2  = {[2.extend_done, 2.retract_done], [2.extend, 2.retract]} 
𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃3  = {[3.retract_done, 3.extend_done, 3.open_done, 3.close_done, 
3.stop_done], [3.retract, 3.extend, 3.open, 3.close, 3.raise, 3.lower, 
3.stop]} 
𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃4  = {[4.new_pipe_ready], [4.new_pipe]} 
 57 
𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃5  = {[5.extend_done, 5.retract_done, 5.make_connection_done], [5.extend, 
5.retract, 5.make_connection]} 
𝑆𝐹𝑆𝑁𝑃6  = {[6.error_done, 6.fix_alignment], [6.error_done, 6.align_fixed]} 
 
 
Figure 8.  High-level view of schematic for the Snubbing New Pipe Operation Module. 
(See Appendix G – Snubbing Modular Controller Preliminary Designs for 
the full-size diagrams of the completed snubbing operation modules.) 
6.6.3 Low Level 
The Low Level of controls manages the communication between the Operation 
Modules and the sub-systems, which include Equipment Controller Modules, Manual 
Modules, and Physics-Based / Algorithm Modules. Defined below are the finite state 
machine and module for the manual error intervention, the diagram for which is shown in 
Figure 9: 
𝐹𝑀 = (𝑋𝐹𝑀 ,  𝑇𝐹𝑀 ,  𝑅𝐹𝑀 ,  𝜏𝐹𝐶𝑀 , 𝑥0𝐹𝑀 ,  𝑥𝑑𝑝𝐹𝑀 ,  𝑋𝑀𝐹𝑀 ) 
 
where 
 
𝑋𝐹𝑀 = {idle, manual_control} 
𝑇𝐹𝑀= {1.error, 2.auto} 
𝑅𝐹𝑀 = {1.error_done, 2.manual} 
𝜏𝐹𝑀 = {(1.error, [ ], idle, manual_control, [2.manual] , [ ]), 
(2.auto, [ ], manual_control, idle, [1.error_done] , [ ])} 
𝑥0𝐹𝑀  = idle 
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𝑥𝑑𝑝𝐹𝑀  = dump 
𝑋𝑀𝐹𝑀  = idle 
 
Defined below is the module for the manual error intervention:  
 
𝑀 = (𝐹𝑀, {𝑆𝑀1}) 
where 
 
𝐹𝑀 = Described above. 
𝑆𝑀1 = {[1.error, 2.auto], [1.error_done, 1.manual]} 
 
 
Figure 9.  Manual error intervention module for snubbing operations. 
6.6.4 Sub Level 
The Sub Level of control contains the control modules which are specific to each 
piece of equipment. These modules take commands from the Low Level modules and 
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send the appropriate command to its corresponding equipment. Defined below are the 
finite state machine and module for the catcher’s mitt, the diagram for which is shown in 
Figure 10: 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑀 = (𝑋𝐹𝐶𝑀 ,  𝑇𝐹𝐶𝑀 ,  𝑅𝐹𝐶𝑀 ,  𝜏𝐹𝐶𝑀 , 𝑥0𝐹𝐶𝑀
,  𝑥𝑑𝑝𝐹𝐶𝑀
,  𝑋𝑀𝐹𝐶𝑀
) 
 
where 
 
𝑋𝐹𝐶𝑀 = {retracted, extended} 
𝑇𝐹𝐶𝑀= {1.extend, 1.retract} 
𝑅𝐹𝐶𝑀 = {1.extend_done, 1.retract_done} 
𝜏𝐹𝐶𝑀 = {(1.extend, [ ], retracted, extended, [1.extend_done] , [ ]), 
(1.retract, [ ], retracted, retracted, [1.retract_done] , [ ]), 
(1.extend, [ ], extended, extended, [1.extend_done] , [ ]), 
(1.retract, [ ], extended, retracted, [1.retract_done] , [ ]), 
(1.retract, [ ], retracted, retracted, [1.retract_done] , [ ])} 
𝑥0𝐹𝐶𝑀
 = retracted 
𝑥𝑑𝑝𝐹𝐶𝑀
 = dump 
𝑋𝑀𝐹𝐶𝑀
 = retracted 
 
Defined below is the equipment module for the catcher’s mitt:  
 
𝐶𝑀 = (𝐹𝐶𝑀, {𝑆𝐶𝑀1}) 
where 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑀 = Described above. 
𝑆𝐶𝑀1 = {[1.extend, 1.retract], [1.extend_done, 1.retract_done]} 
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Figure 10.  Catcher’s mitt module in snubbing operations. 
6.7 COLLISION DETECTION 
Both the heuristics and bounding box methods to collision detection are good 
starting approaches to collision detection in snubbing operations. For ABB, the global 
reference frame for the bounding boxes will be located at the well center at the rig floor, 
as it is a fixed point that is integral to snubbing operations. Each piece of equipment will 
have a local reference frame attached to the center of the piece of equipment, and the 
equipment’s bounding box will be defined with respect to the local reference frame. As 
with the approach in the case study, all equipment movement will be calculated with 
respect to the global reference frame, for detection of overlapping bounding boxes prior 
to the occurrence of a collision.  
6.8 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
After the design of the supervisory controller is complete, it is necessary to verify 
the correctness of the controlled system model, and test the behavior of the system via 
model checking and simulations. 
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Model checking of the snubbing supervisory controller should be based on a 
finalized list of the LTL specifications described in Appendix F – Snubbing Automation 
Formal Specifications to verify the controlled system operates safely and behaves as 
desired. 
The first phase of simulation for evaluation of the snubbing controller 
performance will be for error-free snubbing operations with original snubbing equipment. 
The second phase of simulation will be to evaluate the ability of the controller to detect 
common snubbing errors. The primary error cases which will be explored are as follows: 
 End of pipe not caught by catcher’s mitt during operations to transport pipe to and 
from the well center. 
 Failure of tongs dies. 
 Annular BOP leak. 
 Overly tight joints while breaking connections. 
 Stabbing plate misalignment. 
If modifications to the controller design need to be made as a result of simulation 
observations, the error-free simulation will be rerun to ensure error-free operations have 
not been affected by the modifications. The final phase of simulation is to explore the 
case of introducing a new piece of equipment, for instance a gantry robot, to the snubbing 
unit. The capabilities of the gantry robot will be assessed to understand if and where 
modifications to the current structure must be made before simulation of the error-free 
and common error cases are done. Success of the controller feasibility will be evaluated 
through its ability to perform the desired operations for all simulations. 
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6.9 SUMMARY 
The proven concept from the case study reflects the feasibility of modMFSM 
application to drilling and snubbing operations, as shown in Figure 6, which presents the 
modules for snubbing operations and how it compares to those from the conveyor belt 
drilling system case study. The system components have been identified, and a process 
narrative has been defined for snubbing operations. Preliminary LTL system 
specifications have been defined and initial designs of select snubbing operational modes 
are to be finalized in future research. 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusions and Future Work 
The completed work focused on definition of the extended modular finite state 
machine controller (modMFSM) structure, implementation of the modMFSM structure to 
a simplified conveyor belt drilling system, definitions of system equipment and 
environment for snubbing operations, and preliminary designs for the vending machine 
toy problem supervisory controller, found in Appendix G – Snubbing Modular Controller 
Preliminary Designs.  
7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
The contributions of this research to drilling automation supervisory control 
research is in providing a feasible framework for supervisory controllers for drilling 
operations and its auxiliary operations, while maintaining safe operations, overcoming 
the challenges of interoperability, reacting to environment cues, and allowing for easy 
modification and functional scalability.  
The modMFSM structure allows for the augmentation of the modular finite state 
machine structure to adapt to complex systems and their uncertain environments. The 
first extension of the modular finite state machine structure is to explore the use of 
various models inside modules, specifically the inclusion of guards in the trigger / 
response finite state machines for response to changing environment and system 
variables. 
The modMFSM structure also explores the feasibility of including modules which 
encompass physics-based models rather than discrete event models processes or 
hardware. In the snubbing case study, collision detection is implemented. Proving the 
feasibility of this implementation provides a stepping stone for inclusion of other physics-
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based models environment in supervisory control of complex systems, for instance, 
allowing for kick detection in drilling or detection of alien objects in manufacturing.  
Additionally, the modMFSM framework allows for automatic reconfiguration of 
the controller and automatic synthesis of filters and modules to replace missing 
equipment. The plug-and-play quality of the controller architecture also allows for easy 
incorporation of new equipment with minimal modification of the original controller.  
7.2 FUTURE WORK 
Future work of this research is to verify the formal correctness of the controlled 
simplified system model, and test for compositional correctness. Additionally, robustness 
of the system to input order can also be tested using the formal verification procedure 
presented and applied to ECA MFSMs by Allen et al. (Allen et al., 2012). After 
verification of the simplified system, the next step would be to finalize, validate, and 
verify the snubbing supervisory controller.  
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A – SNUBBING UNIT EQUIPMENT 
Snubbing units exist as both standalone and rig-assist units. This section discusses 
the general machinery used by all snubbing units. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Superior mechanized, standalone snubbing unit. 
Similar to drilling operations, snubbing operations require a hoisting device, 
called an elevator, to run pipe into and out of the well during pipe-heavy operations. In 
snubbing, this process is called stripping. The elevator also raises and lowers pipe when 
pipe connections are made or broken. In addition to vertical movement, elevators include 
bails that extend and retract to allow for lateral movement of the pipe. While a standalone 
snubbing unit contains its own elevator, a rig-assist unit may utilize the elevator that 
exists as part of the hoisting system on the host drilling rig. 
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Figure 12.  Floor of a workover unit where the yellow elevator is near the floor (Shengji 
Group, 2016). 
Pipe is transported between its storage location in vertical or horizontal racks and 
the floor of the snubbing unit using pipe handling equipment. A variety of mechanized 
pipe handling equipment can be used, including catwalks for horizontal to vertical pipe 
handling, and racking systems like NOV’s Hydraracker systems for transportation from 
vertical pipe racks. NOV’s Hydraracker systems are able securely position new pipe 
ready for a connection to be made with the pipe in the well. However, if the pipe 
handling system requires the elevator to assist in bringing the pipe to the well center, a 
catcher’s mitt in the snubbing unit is used to catch the new pipe as it is hoisted away from 
the pipe handling system and brought toward the well center. 
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Figure 13.  a) Catwalk in action on a Superior snubbing unit (left); b) NOV Hydraracker 
(Hsieh & Vigh, 2017) (right). 
 
 
Figure 14.  Catcher’s mitt extended and ready to catch the new pipe coming from the 
catwalk. 
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In order to connect or disconnect pipe as it is run into and out of the well, 
equipment such as hydraulically powered tongs apply the required torque to make or 
break the pipe-to-pipe connection.  
 
 
Figure 15.  NOV Hydraulic Power Tongs (National Oilwell Varco, 2018a) 
In regular drilling operations, a device called slips grip and hold the drill string to 
the rig floor, preventing the drill string from falling into the well. For snubbing 
operations, slips serve two purposes: 1) hold the drill string stationary, 2) assist in 
pushing/pulling the drill string in/out of the well. The slips that hold the drill string 
stationary are called stationary slips and are located on the floor of the unit. Two sets of 
stationary slips exist, one set for pipe-light operations, and the other set for pipe-heavy 
operations. The slips that assist in snubbing the drill string are called the travelling slips. 
The travelling slips are located on the hydraulically powered snubbing jack, which moves 
the travelling slips vertically, applying the necessary snubbing force to run pipe in and 
out of the well. Similar to the stationary slips, the travelling slips also exist in two sets for 
pipe-light and pipe-heavy operations.  
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Figure 16.  Snubbing jack near maximum height as it snubs out pipe. 
 
Figure 17.  Slips for snubbing operations (Westco International Consulting, Inc, 2017). 
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Since snubbing operations occur while the well is pressurized, well control 
equipment is crucial. The primary components of the basic snubbing well control 
equipment stack are: an annular blowout preventer (BOP), two snubbing pipe ram 
blowout preventers (BOPs), safety pipe ram BOPs, safety blind ram BOPs, an bleed-off 
line, and a pump-in line.  BOPs prevent well fluids from uncontrolled travel to surface 
and allow the crew to maintain control on the wellbore pressure. The annular BOP, which 
sits at the top of the snubbing well control equipment stack, contains a rubber element 
that seals around the drill string and adjusts its seal as pipe joints, and tools pass through 
it during stripping and snubbing operations. The annular BOP remains closed throughout 
the snubbing operations. The snubbing pipe ram BOPs are manufactured to fit either one 
pipe diameter or a small range of pipe diameters (Mitchell & Miska, 2011). Therefore, 
the pipe ram BOPs seal around the drill pipe only, and can handle higher pressures than 
the annular BOP. They generally remain open if the wellbore pressure is below the 
working pressure of the annular BOP. However, if the wellbore pressure exceeds the 
working pressure of the annular BOP, at least one pipe ram BOP must be closed around 
the pipe at all times to ensure a secure pressure barrier as pipe is run into and out of the 
well. However, since the pipe ram BOPs can only fit a small range of diameters at most, 
special procedures are necessary to pass pipe joints and tools through the pipe ram BOPs. 
For snubbing in procedures, the upper pipe ram starts off closed with the lower pipe ram 
open. When the joint or tool reaches the upper pipe ram, the lower pipe ram is closed, and 
the bleed-off line opened to bleed off the pressure between the rams. The upper pipe ram 
is then opened, and the pipe lowered until the joint or tool is at the lower pipe ram. The 
upper pipe ram is then closed, and the pump-in line is opened to pressurize the section 
between the rams. Once the pressure in that section equals that of the well, the lower pipe 
ram is opened, and snubbing operations continue. The reverse procedures are 
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implemented for snubbing out operations. The safety pipe rams and the safety blind rams 
generally remain open during operations and are only closed in case the snubbing rams 
malfunction. Although the frac valve is part of the wellhead and not part of the snubbing 
stack, it is an integral piece of well control equipment. The frac valve sits below the 
snubbing well control equipment stack, and at the top of the wellhead. It remains open 
during snubbing operations, and is closed when it is necessary to shut in the well. 
 
 
Figure 18.  Basic snubbing well control equipment stack (Grace, 2003). Annular BOP not 
shown. 
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APPENDIX B – CASE STUDY CONTROLLER DESIGN  
The design for the modular supervisory controller for the conveyor belt drilling 
system case study can be found in the supplemental file labeled 
“Appendix_B_Case_Study_Controller_Design.pdf.” 
 
APPENDIX C – CASE STUDY SIMULATION TRANSITIONS AND CODE OUTPUT 
The expected transitions of each simulation case for the conveyor belt drilling 
system case study can be found in the supplemental file labeled 
“Appendix_C_Case_Study_Expected_Transitions.xlsx.”  
The simulation code output for each case can be found in the following 
supplemental files: “Appendix_C_Case_1_Simulation_Code_Output.pdf,” 
“Appendix_C_Case_2_Simulation_Code_Output.pdf,” and 
“Appendix_C_Case_3_Simulation_Code_Output.”  
 
APPENDIX D – PROCESS NARRATIVE FLOWCHARTS FOR SNUBBING 
The mechanized snubbing operations are captured in a series of process narrative 
flowcharts. These flowcharts can be found in the supplemental file labeled 
“Appendix_D_Process_Narrative_Flowcharts_for_Snubbing.pptx.” 
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APPENDIX E – SNUBBING AUTOMATION SENSORS 
Table 3 below presents the system variable necessary for automating snubbing 
operations and the status of its corresponding sensor. From the table, it can be seen that at 
least eighteen sensors are needed for autonomously bringing new pipe to the well center.  
From left to right, the columns describe the variable observed, whether sensor hardware 
exists and its type, suggested sensor hardware if not already available, and the current 
sensing method for the variable. 
Table 3.  Sensors necessary for automated snubbing operations. 
Variable Sensor Hardware Suggested 
Hardware 
Current 
Method 
Stabbing Plate 
Alignment 
None Camera Visual / Manual 
Well Pressure Casing Pressure 
Gauge 
N/A Sensor 
Joint Counter None N/A (Build into 
controller) 
Visual / Manual 
Stripping Bit Depth Block Position N/A Sensor 
Height of Pipe for 
Connection 
Sensor 
Elevator Position Visual / Manual 
Tripping Speed Sensor 
TD/Plug Reached Visual / Manual 
Pull Test for Slips Bite 
Before Balance Point 
None Block Position or 
Snubbing Jack 
Position 
Visual / Manual 
Snubbing Bit Depth Snubbing Jack 
Position (Existence 
Uncertain) 
Snubbing Jack 
Position 
(Existence 
Uncertain) 
Sensor 
Height of Pipe for 
Connection 
Visual / Manual 
Snubbing Jack Position Visual / Manual 
Snubbing Jack Speed Visual / Manual 
Plug Reached Visual / Manual 
Pipe Weight Visual / Manual 
Elevator Closed on Pipe Built-In Open/Close 
Indicator 
N/A Visual / Manual 
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(Table 3 Continued) 
 
Variable Sensor Hardware Suggested 
Hardware 
Current 
Method 
Catwalk Height Built-In Sensor 
(Possible Limit 
Switch) 
N/A Sensor 
Elevator Height at Pipe None Camera Visual / Manual 
Catcher's Mitt 
(Extended/Retracted) 
Built-In Indicator 
(Existence Uncertain) 
N/A Visual / Manual 
Tongs 
(Extended/Retracted) 
Built-In Indicator - 
Well center is set 
point 
N/A Sensor 
Pipe in Catcher's Mitt None Contact or 
Proximity Sensor 
Visual / Manual 
Snub Force (Applied) Snub Gauge  N/A Sensor 
Pressure between RAMs Pressure Gauge N/A Sensor 
Tongs Torque Built-In Torque 
Sensor 
N/A Sensor 
Pipe End in Catwalk None Catwalk Camera Visual / Manual 
Pipe in Skate Basket Visual / Manual 
Tongs Dies Failure Built-In Torque 
Sensor;  
Motor rotation 
encoder on pipe (for 
connections) 
N/A Sensor 
Connection Made Sensor 
BHA Reached None Catwalk Camera 
(BHA nipple or 
flagging pup) 
Visual / Manual 
Hookload for Pull Test 
(~14klbs) 
Hookload N/A Sensor / Visual 
Slips at Tool or 
Connection 
None Camera Visual / Manual 
Connection Position 
Relative to RAMS 
None N/A (Calculations) Manual 
Buoyant Force None N/A   
Friction Force None N/A   
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APPENDIX F – SNUBBING AUTOMATION FORMAL SPECIFICATIONS 
The following table presents the formal specifications for snubbing operations 
derived from the process narrative. Modifications are expected to be needed to include 
requirements for module-to-module behavior specifications. 
Table 4.  Formal specifications for system requirements in operations for bringing new 
pipe to the well center 
Type Requirement 
Behavior 
Linear Temporal Logic 
Liveness Number of pipes in 
well will eventually be 
desired number of pipes 
GF (Num_Pipes_In = Des_Pipes) 
Liveness Number of pipes out 
well will eventually be 
desired number of pipes 
GF (Num_Pipes_Out = Des_Pipes) 
Invariant Use annular BOP if 
P_well < working 
pressure of annular 
BOP 
((P_well  < P_BOP_ann_working) -> (Use annular 
BOP)) ^ ((P_well >= P_BOP_ann_working) -> (Use 
RAMs)) 
Safety F_snub > F_well + 
F_buoyant + F_friction 
- W_pipe 
G (F_snub > F_well + F_buoyant + F_friction - 
W_pipe) 
Safety F_snub < Buckling 
Force of Pipe 
G (F_snub < F_Buckling_Crit/SF) 
Safety F_snub < Collapse 
Force of Pipe 
G (F_snub < F_Collapse_Crit/SF) 
Safety F_snub < Burst Force 
of Pipe 
G (F_snub < F_Burst_Crit/SF) 
Safety Snubbing Speed < Snub 
Speed Limit 
(Surge/Swab) 
G (Speed_snub < Speed_snub_max) 
Safety Tripping Speed < Trip 
Speed Limit 
(Surge/Swab) 
G (Speed_trip < Speed_trip_max) 
Invariant Joints in after Balance 
Point < 20 Implies 
Elevator Following 
(Jts_In_After_Bal_Pt < 20) -> 
(Elevator_Following_Trip) 
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(Table 4 Continued) 
 
Invariant Joints out after Balance 
Point < 10 Implies 
Elevator Following 
(Jts_Out_After_Bal_Pt < 10) -> 
(Elevator_Following_Snub) 
Invariant In Direction AND Feet 
Pipe in Well < Feet In 
at Balance Point - 
Tolerance Implies SIPL 
(Dir_In ^ (Pipe_feet_in < Pipe_at_Bal_Pt + Tol)) -> 
(SIPL) 
Invariant In Direction AND Feet 
Pipe in Well > Feet In 
at Balance Point + 
Tolerance Implies SIPH 
(Dir_In ^ (Pipe_feet_in > Pipe_at_Bal_Pt + Tol)) -> 
(SIPH) 
Invariant Out Direction AND 
Feet Pipe in Well < 
Feet In at Balance Point 
- Tolerance Implies 
SOPL 
(Dir_Out ^ (Pipe_feet_in < Pipe_at_Bal_Pt + Tol)) -
> (SOPL) 
Invariant Out Direction AND 
Feet Pipe in Well > 
Feet In at Balance Point 
+ Tolerance Implies 
SOPH 
(Dir_Out ^ (Pipe_feet_in > Pipe_at_Bal_Pt + Tol)) -
> (SOPH) 
Safety Snubbing Jack Height 
<= Maximum Safe Jack 
Height 
G (Jack_Height < Max_Jack_Safe_Height) 
Safety Snubbing Jack Height 
>= Minimum Safe Jack 
Height 
G (Jack_Height > Min_Jack_Safe_Height) 
None Feet Pipe Moved > 
Frequency for Filling 
Hole with Hydraulic 
Fluid Implies Fill Hole 
with Hydraulic Fluid 
(Pipe_Moved > Freq_Fill_with_Hydraulic_Fluid) -> 
X (Fill Hole with Hydraulic Fluid) 
Safety Do not close empty 
RAMs 
G (RAM_empty -> RAM_open) 
Safety Do not close slips on a 
tool or connection 
G (((Jack_Height < Tool_Joint_Max) ^ 
(Jack_Height > Tool_Joint_Min)) -> Slips_Open) 
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(Table 4 Continued) 
 
Safety If catcher's mitt or 
tongs extended, 
elevator position must 
be above safe lower 
limit, and snubbing jack 
must be at the 
minimum safe jack 
height. 
G ((Mitt_Extended v Tongs_Extended) -> 
((Elevator_Height >= Safe_Lower_Limit) ^ 
(Jack_Height = Min_Jack_Safe_Height))) 
Safety If elevator position 
below safe lower limit 
or snubbing jack above 
safe lower limit, 
catcher's mitt and tongs 
must be retracted. 
G (((Elevator_Height < Safe_Lower_Limit) v 
(Jack_Height >Min_Jack_Safe_Height)) -> 
(!Mitt_Extended ^ !Tongs_Extended)) 
Safety If snubbing jack not at 
safe lower limit, 
elevator position must 
be above safe lower 
limit, and catwalk 
cannot push up pipe. 
G ((Jack_Height > Min_Jack_Safe_Height) -> 
((Elevator_Height > Safe_Lower_Limit) ^ 
(Skate_Basket < Max_Skate_Height))) 
Safety Elevator height should 
always remain more 
than a margin above the 
snubbing jack height. 
G (Elevator_Height > Jack_Height + Margin) 
Safety If connection made or 
connection not broken, 
catcher's mitt must not 
be extended. 
G ((Connection_Made v !Connection_Broken) -> 
!Mitt_Extended) 
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APPENDIX G – SNUBBING MODULAR CONTROLLER PRELIMINARY DESIGNS 
The preliminary designs of the modular supervisory controller for the following 
operation modes are complete: 
 Snubbing New Pipe (SNP) – Moves pipe from the pipe rack to the well center. 
 Snubbing Rack Pipe (SRP) – Moves pipe from the well center to the pipe rack. 
 Snub In Pipe Heavy (SIPH) – Snubs pipe into the well center under pipe-heavy 
conditions. 
 Trip In Pipe Heavy (TIPH) – Trips pipe into the well center under pipe-heavy 
conditions. 
These preliminary designs are expected to be modified before error-free 
simulation to include collision detection modules. Additionally, modifications may be 
made as necessary to accommodate additional assumptions for system simplification. The 
completed preliminary designs can be found in the supplemental file labeled 
“Appendix_G_Modular_Controller_Preliminary_Designs.pdf.”  
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